










LABOR MARKET REGULATION AND 







CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 2041 










An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 




LABOR MARKET REGULATION AND 





When enacting labor market regulation governments face courts that interpret and implement 
the legal code. We show that the incentives for governments for labor market reform increase 
with the uncertainty that is involved in the implementation of legal codes through courts. 
Given that judges have more discretion in common as opposed to civil law systems more 
reform activity as a response to crises should be observed in the former system. This finding 
is backed by evidence from a panel of OECD countries. 
JEL Code: D78, K31. 







University of Siegen 















June 5, 2007 
For helpful comments we thank Helge Berger, Laszlo Goerke, Hans Peter Grüner and 
participants to presentations in Amsterdam and Berlin. 1 Introduction
Although there is a widespread consensus among professional economists and
international organizations that one of the major contributors to unemploy-
ment in developed economies is the (excessive) regulation of labor markets,
countries diﬀer to a considerable degree concerning the level of labor market
regulation despite high rates of unemployment (OECD (1994) and OECD
(2004)). This, inter alia, might reﬂect diﬀerent social traditions, such as the
Nordic, the European or Anglo-american “model”, or the varying strength
and inﬂuence of interest groups such as labor unions (for surveys, see Blan-
chard (2006), or Berger and Danninger (2006)). But countries not only diﬀer
with respect to the level of regulation, they also diﬀer with respect to the
speciﬁcity of regulation. Very often labor market regulation is put into legal
code only in quite general terms. This is particularly the case in legal systems
with a common law system, as opposed to those countries with a civil law
origin, which leave it to the courts to interpret general rules and to adapt
them to speciﬁc cases (see von Mehren and Gordley (1957)).
In this paper, we relate diﬀerences in countries’ legal systems with gov-
ernments’ incentives to change labor market regulation. We develop and test
a theoretical model to show that governments have a larger interest in re-
forming the labor market if they are confronted with a court system that has
more discretion in interpreting the legal code. Intuitively this result stems
from the fact that a government is more willing to take the political costs
of deregulation if it can be less sure that the legal system enforces the legal
code in an employment friendly way. Contrarily, if there is less uncertainty
about the courts’ interpretation of the law the government is less willing to
pursue costly reforms and relies instead on employment friendly court deci-
sions. Leaving it to the court to take the necessary steps, there is no need for
the government to take the blame for unpopular policy measures itself. In
addition to formally deriving our results in a simple game-theoretic model,
we present empirical evidence to support our theoretical results.
Our argument touches on several strands in the literature. Since our
main focus is the governments’ incentives to reform labor market, our ap-
2proach is closely related to the growing literature on the political economy
of economic policy reform.1 In this strand, various arguments have been
developed that try to explain the (non)occurrence of economic reform un-
der uncertainty. Relating to earlier work on the inﬂuence of interest groups
(see Olson (1965)), war of attrition models explain delays in economic re-
form by arguing that uncertainty about the distribution of adjustment costs
is an obstacle to welfare increasing reforms (Alesina and Drazen (1991)).
Also, uncertainty about the beneﬁts of a policy change can obstruct eﬀorts.
Again, welfare improving reforms may be voted down if the decisive voter
is uncertain about his individual beneﬁt from reform (Fernandez and Ro-
drik (1991)). Policy changes that would increase overall welfare may also
fail because of the costly acquisition of necessary information which groups
of society the government should compensate for losses due to policy reform
(Gr¨ uner (2002)). Focussing on the interaction between a government and
a central bank in a game-theoretic setup closely related to ours, Sibert and
Sutherland (2000), Calmfors (2001), Hefeker (2001) or Neugart (2002) study
the incentives of governments to reform labor markets as a consequence to
a change in the monetary regime. In particular, Hefeker (2006) argues that
more uncertainty about the central bank’s reaction function can increase the
incentives of governments to implement labor market reforms.
We add to this existing literature by explicitly taking into account the le-
gal system as an additional player because in our view too little attention has
been paid to the active role that the court system may play in the context of
policy reform. This is particularly true in the ﬁeld of labor market regulation
where an increasing body of evidence suggests that courts have considerable
leeway in interpreting the legal code which, in turn, has repercussions on
the performance of labor markets. In the U.S., for instance, the tremen-
dous increase in the share of temporary agency work has been attributed to
the erosion of the employment-at-will doctrine through court rulings (Autor
(2003)). There is also evidence for Italy that labor courts increasingly ad-
vocate in the interests of employees if the labor market is depressed (Ichino
1There are excellent surveys on the political economy of reform provided by Roland
(2002) or Drazen (2000).
3et al. (2003)). For Germany, Berger and Neugart (2006) ﬁnd evidence for a
nomination bias in court rulings, that is, the share of settlements reached at
each stage of the legal process and the propensity to appeal systematically
varies with the political color of the government that nominated the judges.
Furthermore, they present evidence that the number of cases ﬁled to labor
courts increases unemployment signiﬁcantly.
Finally, we relate to the literature on the role of the legal origin for reg-
ulatory action (e.g. La Porta et al. (1998), Djankov et al. (2002), Djankov
et al. (2003), La Porta et al. (2004), and Botero et al. (2005)). There, le-
gal origin is classiﬁed either as civil or common law with the distinguishing
feature that common law systems exhibit more judicial discretion. Accord-
ing to this approach, one should observe diﬀerent institutional technologies
depending on the legal tradition of countries; while common law countries
depend more on markets and contracts, civil law countries depend more on
regulation. We use indices developed to test those theories of legal origin to
distinguish common from civil law countries in our empirical analysis as a
proxy for the uncertainty governments face with respect to what the legal
system will do in response to its policies. The underlying hypothesis is that
court behavior is less predictable in common law countries which can there-
fore be characterized as creating more uncertainty for governments, inducing
less stringent labor market regulation.
2 The model
Our model consists of two players, the government (G) and the legal sys-
tem (C) which comprises all labor courts.2 We assume the government is
Stackelberg-leader vis ` a vis labor courts (see ﬁgure 1), taking into account
the expected reaction function of the court. First, the government makes its
policy choice θ concerning the level of labor market regulation. Taken this
as given, courts then decide whether and to what degree to conﬁrm, change
or enforce the legal code. The labor court’s level of regulation is denoted by




Nature draws u ˆ   Government 
decides on policy 
θ  
Labor courts 
decide on e 
Figure 1: Sequence of events
e. Since the model is solved by backward induction, we begin by deriving
the courts policy before turning to the government’s policy choice. First,
however, we describe the economy and the objective functions of the players.
2.1 The economy
Unemployment is given as
u = b u + θ + e (1)
where b u refers to the non-regulation level of unemployment in the economy
that is exogenous to government policy and court decision. This level may
also reﬂect cyclical developments, changes in wages, changes in domestic or
foreign demand for domestically produced goods (for instance due to ex-
change rate developments), or technological developments in the economy
with employment friendly technological developments lowering b u and vice
versa.
θ and e are the regulation levels set by the government and the labor
courts, respectively. θ could reﬂect, for instance, an increase in hiring or
ﬁring costs, the implementation of minimum wage laws, beneﬁt systems or
other actions by the government that increase unemployment.3 The model
is very simple in the sense that we only look at unemployment and assume
3We do not enter a discussion here why governments regulate labor markets. Apart from
protecting workers, this is most likely due to political economy considerations (Saint-Paul
(2000)).
5that any regulation will increase unemployment.4 This is obviously a very
strong simpliﬁcation of the labor market. Likewise, we postulate that any
deregulation will lead to more employment. Deviations of e from θ reﬂect
the inﬂuence of labor courts, which might increase e > θ, decrease e < θ, or
simply conﬁrm government policy in court θ = e.
2.2 Preferences










with E as the expectation operator. The government is interested in avoid-
ing deviations of unemployment from zero, which is composed of exogenous
developments b u, and negatively aﬀected by an increase in its policy vari-
able regulation θ. Moreover, the government is averse to deviations of labor
market regulation from its preferred level θ.5 This “target” level can be in-
ﬂuenced by ideological leanings or the politically optimal level of regulation,
resulting from a trade-oﬀ between the interests of diﬀerent groups in society,
such as labor unions or employers’ associations. Changes in government pol-
icy that lead to a deviation of regulation from this level lead to an increasing
loss in utility (for instance in the form of votes that can be obtained). This
basically reﬂects the redistributive feature of labor market policy reforms
where some groups in society gain and other lose. The inﬂuence of such par-
ticular interests is reﬂected in c with a low c denoting a government being
more concerned with employment per se and a high c reﬂecting a government
under considerable pressure from societal groups.
The labor court’s preferences are strongly inﬂuenced by the government’s
preferences.We assume an objective function (a loss function) for the labor
4A more eclectic view on the impact of various labor market institutions on labor
market performance can be found in Freeman (2005), Nickell et al. (2005) or Blanchard
(2006).
5One could allow for diﬀerent ideological leanings of the government by assuming θi
with i reﬂecting diﬀerent types of governments. A left wing government would then have




2 + b(e − b e)
2 . (3)
The labor court as well aims to avoid that unemployment deviates to much
from the target level of zero, and that the realized level of its regulation
decisions deviates too much from a target level b e = (1 − χ)e + χθ, which
is a weighted average of the court’s own preferred level of regulation e and
the government’s policy decision θ. A more pronounced conﬂict between the
court and the government with respect to the “appropriate” level of labor
market regulation is reﬂected in a lower χ and vice versa. The parameter
b > 0 weighs those two losses.
Thus, we think of judges as having policy preferences similar to those of
legislators. Like legislators, they have well clearly deﬁned preferences on poli-
cies, potentially shaped by their ideological stances. Judges and courts that
are more labor friendly or are committed to left-leaning parties might prefer
a high level of regulation, whereas more conservative or employer friendly
judges might have low levels of e. However, judges are rarely entirely free
to set policies but are forced, at least to some degree, to take existing labor
market regulation as a basis for their rulings. Thus, their target levels are
also inﬂuenced by the government’s decision θ. For instance, judges may act
in accordance with their preferred political parties in order to safeguard them
from attacks from the opposition. Such a view on judges preferences ﬁnds
widespread support in the law and economics literature on the behavioral
foundations of judges (see Posner (2005)).6 Moreover recent empirical evi-
dence on the behavior of labor courts ﬁnds, for instance, that judges act more
employee friendly in depressed labor markets (Ichino et al. (2003)). Berger
and Neugart (2006) show that German higher-level labor court judges follow
ideological interests when adjudicating cases.
Moreover, the inclusion of a loss term for the deviation from the legal
code set by the government in judges’ utility functions has been argued for
by Posner (1993). While a political judge may be able to deviate from the
6For example, Shepsle and Bonchek (1997) coin judges as “legislators in robes”. A re-
cent contribution analyzing consequences on the evolution of common law from politically
motivated judges is Gennaioli and Shleifer (2007).
7existing legal code to express his own policy preferences, he will usually also
incur costs from doing so. Reversal of a government decision may be costly
in terms of his career concerns (see also Levy (2005)), and in any case a
deviation from the legal code involves costly expression of a separate opinion.
Furthermore, the judge may also be concerned about his reputation among
other judges whose work he criticizes.
2.3 Policy decisions
As indicated above, we assume that the government is the Stackelberg-leader
in this game between government and legal system. This assumption is
justiﬁed by the fact that regulation policy set by the government is relatively
infrequent whereas the actions of the court are more frequent.
Inserting equation (1) in the courts’ objective function (3), we have the
optimal level of regulation ruled by the court as
e = η [b(1 − χ)e − (1 − bχ)θ − b u] (4)
with η = 1
1+b as the court’s reaction parameter. The court will set a more
employment friendly regulation level the higher is the non-regulation level
of unemployment b u, and the higher is the level of regulation set by the gov-
ernment θ. Thus, periods of crises and structural eﬀects, like globalization,
lead to more employment friendly policies because judges as well are assumed
to aim for low unemployment. Not surprisingly, government regulation and
court regulation are strategic substitutes, so that courts set a less aggressive
regulation policy if the level of regulation set by the government is already
high. Finally, regulation is increasing in the court’s “target level of regula-
tion” e . The personal interest of the court (or its ideological preference for
a certain level of regulation) b clearly increases e. Whether θ or e dominates
depends, of course, on χ.
When determining the government’s optimal policy, we have to take into
account that the government has to set its policy under uncertainty, before
the labor court rules on labor market policies. We assume that the court’s
action is not perfectly predictable due to the discretionary nature of the ju-
8dicial system. While there is a legal code, interpretation of the legal code
is essentially done by the courts and thus e may deviate from θ. The more
independent the legal system is, the more a court can follow its own convic-
tions. Moreover, the government may not be perfectly informed about the
leanings of the judiciary, perhaps simply due to the fact that court decisions
are usually not taken by one single person but by a group of judges. If judges
are appointed by diﬀerent governments because spells on the bench overlap
with governments’ time in oﬃce, a particular government may not be able to
predict individual preferences perfectly or not be able to predict the outcome
of the interaction of judges with diﬀerent preferences. That is, the reaction
function of the court with respect to particular events may not be perfectly
known, and we assume from the government’s point of view that the court’s
reaction parameter η is uncertain with E (η) = η and V ar(η) = σ2
η.7







b2 (1 + χ)[b u + (1 − χ)e]
c + η2 + σ2
η
. (5)
Comparative statics on the optimal policy of the government yield the
following results:
• θ is decreasing in b u reﬂecting the fact that increases in trend unem-
ployment will lead governments to pursue a less aggressive regulatory
policy in order not to increase unemployment further.
• θ is decreasing in uncertainty σ2
η, that is, the higher is the uncertainty
about the court’s behavior the lower is the level of regulation set by
the government. If governments cannot fully control courts they are
prompted to be less aggressive in their regulation policy.
• θ decreases more when b u increases if the uncertainty σ2
η about the
court’s behavior is larger. That is, uncertainty and trend unemployment
are mutally reinforcing in their inﬂuence on government policy.
7That is, we assume that on average the government predicts η correctly.
9• θ is increasing in c, the government’s aversion to deviations from its
preferred level of regulation. Obviously, the more important regulation
is for the government, the more it will attempt to reach this preferred
level.
• θ is decreasing in e reﬂecting the fact that the level of regulation set
by the government and the preferred position of the court for worker
friendly policy are substitutes.
• Finally, θ is decreasing in b the relative weight that the court puts on
reaching its preferred level of worker protection.
Using θ one can determine the equilibrium level of e and then derive the
equilibrium unemployment. Both solutions are not shown or discussed as our
focus is on explaining labor market regulation.
3 Evidence
Next, we use panel data to test for the predictions of our model, particu-
larly the eﬀect of uncertainty of court behavior on governments’ incentives
to change labor market regulation. The data comprises 16 to 18 OECD
countries (depending on the type of model that we estimate).8 As described
below, our dependent variable is only available on a ﬁve year basis starting
in 1970, so in order to have any meaningful time variation we only consider
countries where we have at least ﬁve observations . Hence, our data set is
unbalanced and consists of around 100 (again, depending on the model that
is estimated) observations. We employ a generalized least square estimator
taking into account heteroscedasticity of errors between countries and panel
speciﬁc autocorrelation of errors. All regressions contain time and country
ﬁxed eﬀects to control for variation that our other regressors might not cap-
ture.
8In model 1 as shown in table 2 the following countries are included: Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.
10As a measure for labor market regulation we recur to a (sub)index of the
Fraser Institute’s Index of Economic Freedom.9 This index (lmr) quantiﬁes
labor market regulations such as minimum wages, hiring and ﬁring practices,
the share of the labor force whose wages are set by centralized collective
bargaining, and unemployment beneﬁts (See table 1 for summary statistics
for all variables that we use.) In principle this index may vary between 0
and 10. Our sample has a mean of 4.65 with the most regulated economy
showing up with a value of 2.6 (the Netherlands in year 1970) and the least
regulated being classiﬁed with 8.1 (Japan in year 1985).
Our model recurs to variation in structural unemployment as the source
of crises to which governments and labor courts react in terms of regulation.
Because we lack panel data for that variable, we make use of the misery in-
dex in our testing which uses the sum of the (logs of) the unemployment rate
and the inﬂation rate. Based on the concept of a natural rate of unemploy-
ment, our misery index serves as a proxy for the structural unemployment
rate. Deviations of the actual unemployment rate (which we measure) from
a natural rate of unemployment are adjusted for by the inﬂation rate. Ac-
cording to the natural rate hypothesis changes in the actual unemployment
rate that mirror a change in the underlying structural unemployment rate
should not be accompanied by any variation in the inﬂation rate. Contrarily,
if for example a drop in the unemployment rate did not reﬂect a shift in
the structural rate of unemployment, inﬂation should have increased which
would lead to a smaller (or no) change in the misery variable indicating that
actual unemployment decreased but not the structural rate. The mean un-
employment rate in our sample is 6%. The inﬂation rate is averaging at 7%.
Both variables show considerable variation over time and countries and are
negatively correlated.
The degree of uncertainty with which a government is confronted as courts
decide is central to our story. We use legal origin as a proxy for that. The
underlying assumption for using this indicator is that in a common law sys-
tem where courts decide on a case basis outcomes of the legal system may
9In the Appendix we provide a detailed description of all variables and corresponding
data sources.
11vary to a larger extent than in a civil law system which codiﬁes (strict) rules
that judges have to follow. The notion of legal origin deﬁning the discretion
of the judiciary system has gained considerable attention in the literature as
a major cause for the proliferation of market regulation. See, e.g., La Porta
et al. (1998), Djankov et al. (2002), Djankov et al. (2003), La Porta et al.
(2004), and Botero et al. (2005). We give a twist to the existing studies by
using this well know indicator as a proxy for uncertainty from the perspec-
tive of the government about how courts will handle labor market regulation.
Principally, we use the same indicator which draws on the CIA’s The World
Factbook. The assertion made in those references whether a legal system has
a common or a civil law origin refers to a country’s legal system in general.
However, as we deal with labor market regulation we adjusted the index in
the case of Germany classifying it case-based as this is how legal scholars
see German labor law (Richardi (2005)). We know of no other country in
our sample where we should adjust the index.10 Note, that out of the 18
countries in our sample, four have a common (labor) law (Canada, Germany,
United Kingdom, United States).
In order to control for other, possibly competing explanations of labor
market regulation, we introduce a set of additional variables. One may argue
that (labor market) policy change is hampered by veto players – in terms
of their number or, given their number, the distance in their preferences
over economic policies (Tsebelis (2002)). We try to model this potential
explanation by using a ﬁve-year average of an indicator developed by Henisz
(2000). This indicator (polcon) takes into account the number of veto players
and their heterogeneity with respect to policies. It may vary between 0 and 1
with higher values indicating more resistance to policy changes.11 We interact
polcon with lagged regulation (lmr(t-5).
Furthermore, one may be concerned that ideologies towards certain types
of regulatory actions explain economic policy reform. In this case, simply the
color of the ruling governments should have an impact on the policy. For this
10Note, however, that all the empirical results that we present below do not depend on
Germany’s classiﬁcation of the legal system.
11The minimum of 0 refers to the dictatorships in Spain and Portugal that still existed
in the earlier part of our sample period.
12we control with a dummy variable that is one (and otherwise zero) if within
the last ﬁve years the executive stemmed from the left side of the political
spectrum as deﬁned by the World Bank Indicators on Political Institutions.
Finally, we take care of the potential inﬂuence interest groups may exert
on labor market regulation. Here we opted for union density as a proxy for
the inﬂuence for trade unions on (labor market) policies. The sample mean
for union density is at roughly 40% of the workforce (ranging from 9% to
87%).
In table 2 we summarize our regression results. Model 1 presents the
results when we simply regress labor market regulation on itself with a ﬁve
year lag and the set of time and country ﬁxed eﬀects. The positive coeﬃcient
suggests a monotone convergence to some steady state level of labor market
regulation.12 Extending this simple speciﬁcation with the ﬁve years lagged
value of our misery variable shows that countries in crisis tend to deregulate
the labor market. Moreover our point estimate of 0.187 is highly signiﬁcant.
Introducing the interaction variable taking into account the uncertainty a
government may face with respect to the actions of the labor courts yields the
sign predicted by our model. In common law countries, for which we argue
that governments face more uncertainty with respect to courts’ behavior,
governments deregulate more in response crises. The estimated parameter is
signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Furthermore, the parameter on the lagged misery
variable hardly changes with the inclusion of the interaction term. Evaluated
at the sample mean of the common variable a crisis of the size of one standard
deviation increases labor market regulation by 0.25 units (in a sample size
varying between 2.6 and 8.1). Almost a third of that eﬀect is driven by the
interaction term which captures the uncertainty that a government faces with
respect to what the legal system will do.
Next, we turn to our additional control variables. We do not ﬁnd evidence
for the veto player story. The coeﬃcient on the variable that interacts the
measure for policy resistance with the lagged index of labor market regula-
12Note, however, that our estimates are subject to the Nickell bias as N > T. Thus,
an interpretation of the size of the parameter with respect to the speed of the adjustment
process would be misleading.
13tion is insigniﬁcant. Perhaps more importantly the inclusion of the lagged
interaction variable on policy resistance does also not harm our ﬁndings that
uncertainty of court rulings spurs governments’ incentives to deregulate in
times of crises. The lagged labor market regulation variable loses some of its
precision. In Model 5 and Model 6 we control for the political color of the
executive and the potential role of interest groups, respectively. Neither do
governments on the left of the political spectrum conduct labor market poli-
cies diﬀerently from governments of the other political color, nor do unions
have an inﬂuence on labor market regulations in our sample. It is still crises
which coincides with lower labor market regulation, and the more so as the
courts’ rulings are uncertain from the perspective of the policy making insti-
tution. Note that the inclusion of those additional two controls renders the
lagged labor market regulation index insigniﬁcant.
In Model 3, which is our most preferred speciﬁcation, all country ﬁxed
eﬀects except for one show up signiﬁcantly. In addition, all time ﬁxed eﬀects
are signiﬁcant. Overall, most of those ﬁxed eﬀects are signiﬁcant at a one-
percent signiﬁcance level. Figure 2 contrasts the predicted labor market
regulations of our model against the actual values.
Overall, we are quite satisﬁed with our empirical ﬁndings. A check for
robustness of Model 3 where we excluded countries sequentially from our
sample was rather promising. Only in two cases (Canada and Japan) the
parameter on the misery variable became insigniﬁcant.13 One may raise
concerns about the validity of our endogenous variable as the Fraser Institute
is mostly considered as liberal perhaps biasing the labor market regulation
index. Firstly, such a bias will not aﬀect our results as long as it leads to an
exaggerated description of the extent of labor market regulation throughout
the panel. Secondly, the Global Labor Survey, an internet based survey
among labor practitioners including union leaders, activists or professor for
labor law revealed that the index by the Fraser Institute (which we use) gives
a similar picture as the Global Labor Survey Chor and Freeman (2005). The
13Note, however, that our results react sensitively to the inclusion of New Zealand in
our sample. For Model 3 the parameters on misery(t-5) and the interacted misery variable
become insigniﬁcant with p-values slightly above the 10% margin.
14Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
lmr 4.65 1.522 2.6 8.1
ur 5.985 4.05 0.2 22.7
inﬂation 6.995 5.537 -0.671 24.875
misery 3.221 1.052 -0.218 5.221
exe left 0.159 0.367 0 1
union 0.418 0.2 0.09 0.87
polcon 0.734 0.186 0 0.893
common 0.222 0.417 0 1
advantage of the Fraser Institute is its time dimension which gives us an




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In this paper, we look at the issue of labor market policy regulation. Our
approach diﬀers from the existing literature in that we explicitly take into
account labor courts as a strategic player. We believe that the role of courts
has so far been largely neglected in studying governments’ incentives for pol-
icy change. This is problematic, given the ample evidence concerning the
discretion that courts have in interpreting the legal code. Our main ﬁnding
is that as labor courts’ actions are more uncertain from the perspective of
the government, governments will reform more intensively. The more discre-
tion labor courts have, the more governments have an incentive to pursue
employment friendly regulatory policy. In addition to the formal derivation
of this result, we also present evidence to support this ﬁnding. Taking the
legal origin of countries as a proxy for judiciary discretion, and thus uncer-
tainty about labor courts’ actions, we ﬁnd that governments’ policies diﬀer
signiﬁcantly in response to crises. Countries with a civil law origin respond
less to economic crisis than countries with a common law system.
While we stress the interaction between governments enacting labor mar-
ket regulation and labor courts activity, there are certainly other ﬁelds of
economic policy making where this type of interaction between governments
and the legal system could play an important role in explaining policy mak-
ing. There is, for instance, also still little knowledge about economic policy
making in the context of a European legal system, an issue which is becoming
more and more important for national policymakers.
Appendix
Data sources
In the following we summarize the deﬁnitions of the variables used in the
regression models and the data sources.
• lmr: Labor market regulation as measured by the Fraser Institute’s
Index of Economic Freedom, Area 5B. This comprises information on
17labor market regulations such as minimum wages, hiring and ﬁring
practices, the share of the labor force whose wages are set by cen-
tralized collective bargaining and unemployment beneﬁts system. The
index may vary between 0 and 10 with higher values indicating a less
regulated economy. Source: Economic Freedom of the World, 2005
Annual Report by J. Gwartney, R. Lawson and E. Gartzke.
• misery: This variable is the sum of the logs of the unemployment rate
ur and the inﬂation rate inﬂation in a respective country at time t
as an average of the past ﬁve years. The inﬂation rate is based on
consumer prices. The unemployment rate corresponds to the OECD’s
deﬁnition of standardized unemployment rates. Source: World Devel-
opment Indicators (http : //web.worldbank.org) and OECD (http :
//www1.oecd.org/scripts
/cde/members/lfsindicatorsAuthenticate.asp)
• common: This is a dummy variable with the value of 1 for all countries
classiﬁed as having a common law origin. The variable is zero for all
other cases. Legal origin is deﬁned as in Botero et al. (2005). Source:
http : //mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/
publications.html and CIA World Factbook 2007,
https : //www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/.
• exe left: This variable is based on data provided by the World Bank
Indicators on Political Institutions. The variable execrlc is recoded
as a dummy variable such that it is one if the party aﬃliation of the
executive is left AND the executive did not change color within the
last ﬁve years. Source: DPI2004 Database of Political Institutions:
Changes and Variable Deﬁnitions, by P. Keefer, July 2005 (http :
//econ.worldbank.org).
• union: Union density as a ﬁve year average of yearly values. The values
for the years 1996-2000 are averages of the years 1996 to 1998. Source:
LMIDB Version 2.0, Nickell and Nunziata (2001).
18• polcon: This variable captures the feasibility of policy change. It ranges
from 0 to 1. At time t values are stored which are averages of POL-
CONV of the ﬁve past years. POLCONV basically reﬂects the number
of independent branches of governments that have veto power, their
preferences, the status quo policy, and heterogeneity between and of
veto players. Source: Henisz (2000).
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